This leads to a second point, namely, that in design, it is essential to examine the entire system: the equipment, the crew, the social structure, learning and training, cooperative activity, and the overall goals of the task. Analyses and remedies that look at isolated segments are apt to lead to local, isolated improvements, but they may also create new problems and difficulties at the system level. Too often, the implementation of some new "improved" automatic system, warning signal, retraining, or procedure is really a sign of poor overall design: Had the proper system level analysis been performed, quite a different solution might have resulted.
Automation: Simultaneously Too Much and Too Little
Consider the task of the crew on a modern commercial airplane.
Most of the flight activity is routine. Large, modem aircraft are relatively easy to fly: The airplane is stable, responsive, and maneuverable.
The automatic equipment monitors all operations and helps ease the workload of the crew. Indeed, whereas the commercial airplane of a few years ago required a crew of three, the newer planes need only two people to fly them, and most of the time, only one is really necessary.
Most of this is good, and the accident rate with modem aircraft has been decreasing over the years, the decrease highly correlated with (and usually thought to be a result of) the introduction of high-technology controls and automation. There are problems, however.
For one, the sheer size of the plane means that the crew cannot know all that is happening. Airlines had earlier performed a study of simulated pilot incapacitation:
In the United simulator study, when the captain feigned subtle incapacitation while flying the aircraft during an approach, 25 percent of the aircraft hit the "ground."
The study also showed a significant reluctance of the first officer to take control of the aircraft. It required between 30 sec and 4 rain for the other crew member to recognize that the captain was incapacitated and to correct the situation.
(NTSB, 1980)
The Case of the Fuel Leak
In the previous two case studies, the crew was unaware of the developing problems.
In this third case study, the vigilant second officer noticed one sign of a problem, but failed to detect another.
Here is a quotation from the accident report filed with the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (Data Report 64441, dated Feb, 1987). 1 Shortly after level off at 35,000 ft... the second officer brought to my attention that he was feeding fuel to all three engines from the number 2 tank, but was showing a drop in the number 3 tank. I sent the second officer to the cabin to check that side from the window.
While he was gone, I noticed that the wheel was cocked to the right and told the first officer who was flying the plane to take the autopilot off and check. When the autopilot was disengaged, the aircraft showed a roll tendency confirming that we actually had an out-of-balance condition.
The second officer returned and said we were losing a large amount of fuel with a swirl pattern of fuel running about midwing to the tip, as well as a vapor pattern covering the entire portion of the wing from midwing to the fuselage. At this point we were about 2000 lbs. out of balance ....
In this example, the second officer (the flight engineer) provided the valuable feedback that something seemed wrong with the fuel balance. The automatic pilot had quietly and efficiently compensated for the resulting weight imbalance, and had the second officer not noted the fuel discrepancy, the situation would not have been noted until much later, perhaps too late.
Suppose the automatic pilot could have signaled the crew that it was starting to compensate the balance more than was usual, or at the least, more than when the autopilot was first engaged?
This would have alerted the crew to a potential problem. Technically, this information was available to the crew, because the autopilot controls the aircraft by physically moving the real instruments and controls, in this situation, by rotating the control wheel to maintain balance. The slow but consistent turning of the wheel could have been noted by any of the three crew members. This is a subtle cue, however, and it was not noted by either the pilot or the co-pilot (the first officer) until after the second officer had reported the fuel unbalance and had left the cockpit.
The Problem Is Not Automation, It Is Lack of Feedback
Automation is increasingly blamed for problems in high-risk industry. The general theme of the argument is that in the "good old days," prior to automation, the controllers were actively engaged in the plant operation. They had to monitor everything and control everything. This had problems, in particular, high mental workloads and overreliance on people's abilities to be continually alert, accurate, and knowledgeable.
But it had the virtue of keeping the operators continually informed as to the state of the system.
In That is, automatic equipment seems to function best when the workload is light and the task routine: When the task requires assistance, when the workload is highest, this is when the automatic equipment is of least assistance---this is the "irony" of automation (Bainbridge, 1987 ; see also S. Norman & Orlady, 1989). What of the fact that the people are "out of the loop"? Is this the major culprit?
In some of the case studies in this paper, the crew-was clearly out of the loop, failing to detect symptoms of trouble early enough to do anything about them. But in one of the studies, the case of the "incapacitated" pilot, no automation was involved.
Instead, there was an uncommunicative captain, plus social pressures that worked against a junior first officer interrupting the activities of a senior captain. In other words, although the human operators are indeed no longer "in the loop," the culprit is not automa-
tion, it is the lack of continual feedback and interaction.
Two Thought Experiments
Consider two thought experiments.
In the first, imagine a captain of a plane who turns control over to the autopilot, as in the case studies of the loss of engine power and the fuel leak. In the second thought experiment, imagine that the captain turns control over to the first officer, who flies the plane "by hand." In both of these situations, as far as the captain is concerned, the control has been automated:
by an autopilot in one situation and by the first officer in the other. But in the first situation, if problems occur, the autopilot will compensate and the crew will notice only by chance (as in the case study of the fuel leak). When automatic devices compensate for problems silently and efficiently, the crew is "out of the loop," so that when failure of the compensatory equipment finally occurs, they are not in any position to respond immediately and appropriately.
In the case of the second thought experiment where the control was turned over to the first officer, we would expect the first officer to be in continual interaction with the captain. Consider how this would have worked in the case studies of the loss of engine power or the fuel leak. In either case, the problem would almost definitely had been detected much earlier in the flight. The first officer would probably have said something like "I seem to be correcting this thing more and more---I wonder what's happening?" Yes, from the captain's point of view the rest of the crew serves as a type of automaton, but one that observes and remarks upon conditions. By reporting upon observations and possible discrepancies, each crew member keeps the rest informed and alerted--keeping everyone "in the loop." The observations of these thought experiments are buttressed by the situation described in the case study of the fuel leak, where the second officer, routinely scanning the gauges, noted a puzzling discrepancy and commented on it to the captain. As the captain's report said, "the second officer brought to my attention that he was feeding fuel to all three engines from the number 2 tank, but was showing a drop in the number 3 tank. I sent the second officer to the cabin to check that side from the window."
Here, even though the second officer did not understand the reason for the discrepant fuel gauge reading, the voiced observation prompted the captain to look over the aircraft by sending the second officer to the cabin to examine the wing and for himself to check the cockpit. The cockpit check led the captain to note that the "wheel was cocked to the right," which then led to the discovery of the weight imbalance caused by a massive fuel leak. At the time the second officer commented on the fuel gauge reading, he did not know what the problem was, but his comment alerted the crew.
Again, this observation makes the point that the culprit is not actually automation, but rather the lack of feedback. The informal chatter that normally accompanies an experienced, socialized crew tends to keep everyone informed of the complete state of the system, allowing for the early detection of anomalies. Hutchins (in press) has shown how this continual verbal interaction in a system with highly social crews serves to keep everyone attentive and informed, helps the continual traIning of new members of the crew, and serves as a natural monitor for error.
The Solution? More Appropriate Automation
The message is that automation, per se, is not the culprit in high-risk situations.
Many of the current problems are indeed a result of automation, but only in the sense that the automation is inappropriately designed and applied. When people perform actions, feedback is essential for the appropriate monitoring of those actions, to allow for the detection and correction of errors, and to keep alert. This is hardly a novel point: Feedback is an essential aspect of We Do Not Know Enough to Mimic Natural all control theory. But adequate feedback to the Human Interaction human operators is absent far more than it is present, whether the system be a computer Note that the problems in all three of the case operating system, an autopilot, or a telephone system. In fact, it is rather amazing how such an essential source o fin formation could be skipped:
The need for complete feedback is one of the major points of Norman (1988 People construct mental models of systems with which they interact.
The model is construtted entirely from what I have called "the system image," the information available to them from the system, the environment, and their instructions (Norman, 1986) . But this system image depends critically upon the information displays of modern equipment. When we send a command to an automated piece of equipment, the only way we can update our mental models of the system is through the feedback provided us. In the first case study, the China Airlines situation where the autopilot kept compensating for the loss of engine power, if the autopilot had been intelligent enough, it might have reported the need to keep compensating. In the case study of the weight imbalance caused by a studies were not due to a lack of information, at least not in the technical sense. Autopilots work by physically moving the same controls that the pilots use. In the case studies of the loss of engine power and the fuel leak, the autopilots compensated by turning the control wheels. In theory, the crew could have noted the problem quite early by noting the position of the wheels, just as the second officer did note an abnormality in the fuel gauge readings in the fuel leak case study. Similarly, there was sufficient information in the case of pilot incapacitation. In these cases the problem was that no person or system commented upon the issues, so that nothing brought the potential problem to the attention of the relevant people. The feedback was potentially available, but it was not attended to properly. 2 The task of presenting feedback in an appropriate way is not easy to do. Indeed, we do not yet know how to do it. We do have a good example of how not to inform people of possible difficulties:
overuse of alarms. One of the problems of modern automation is the unintelligent use of alarms, each individual instrument having a single threshold condition that it uses to sound a buzzer or flash a message to the operator, warning of problems. the system, in a normal natural way, much in 2 During the writing of this paper, I took part in an informal replication of the fuel leak incident in the NASA-Ames fullvision, full-motion 727 simulator. Once again, the secondoffiee_ failed to note the discrepant control wheel position, even though in this case he had read the relevant accident report"The normal cockpit activities drew the focus of attention away from the control wheel position. Our analyses afterwards indicated that the wheel position was not a very salient clue in any case. We plan furtherstudies including acarefulreplication of this situation as well as a formal experimental study of the two "thought experiments" described in this paper.
the manner that human participants in a joint problem-solving activity will discuss the issues among themselves.
This Consider what would be required of a fuel monitoring system to detect that the fuel level of tank x was dropping, but that fuel was only supposed to be fed from tank y. To solve this problem, in the general case, requires an intelligent system, one that understands the implications of the various control settings of the system. There probably has to be a knowledge base of the systems in the aircraft plus an internal representation for the items that would allow the system to reason about the potential cases. This is the sort of thing done today in laboratories of artificial intelligence and cognitive science, but we do not know how to solve this problem, for the general case. Moreover, even if the automatic monitoring equipment were to note the existence of a system trend or discrepancy that could lead to a difficulty later on, how should it be brought to the attention of the operators in a natural, intelligent fashion, much the way that normal cockpit conversation works?
The solutions will require higher levels of automation, some forms of intelligence in the controls, an appreciation for the proper form of human communication that keeps people well informed, on top of the issues, but not annoyed and irritated. Our current level of knowledge is not enough to do these things.
The New Irony of Overautomation
Many ills have been laid at the feet of "overautomation."
Too much automation takes the human out of the control loop, it deskills them, and it lowers morale. One much remarkedupon irony of automation is that it fails when it is most needed. I agree with all the analyses of the problems, but from these analyses, I reach the opposite conclusion, a different irony: Our current problems with automation, problems that tend to be blamed on "overautomation,"
are probably the result of just the opposite problem--the problem is not that the automation is too powerful, the problem is that it is not powerful enough.
Why Don't Current Systems Provide Feedback?
Why do current systems have such poor feedback and interaction?
In part, the reason is a lack of sensitivity on the part of the designer, but in part, it is for a perfectly natural reason: The automation itself doesn't need it! That is, if a designer is asked to design an automatic piece of equipment to control some function, the task is completed when the device functions as 
